SUMMARY

For over 65 years, beginning with the Small Business Act of 1953, the federal government has embraced legislation and policies with the goals of aiding, counseling, assisting and protecting the interests of small business concerns. Contracting preferences have been extended to small business participants, for example, in the 8(a) Business Development program, the HUBZone program, the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business program, and the Woman-Owned Small Business program to diversify the industrial base, create jobs, and increase competition.

On December 17, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Small Business Runway Extension Act, which changed the small business size calculation from a three-year to five-year average of revenues. Size standards are important because they establish eligibility for a variety of small business assistance programs, including government contracting initiatives and loan programs designed to assist small businesses in obtaining federal government contracts. The Small Business Administration is now going through its internal processes to revise its regulations to implement this modest legislation, which observers have noted benefits some firms but has potential adverse implications for others.

While the immediate contracting community focus is on this particular change, it brings to light the broader issues surrounding set-aside contracting policies. While the social and economic objectives of small business policy are certainly admirable, they may not be rational from an economic or technical standpoint and may have unintended consequences in terms of job creation, value creation for their founders/owners, and mission effectiveness. There may be more direct ways to achieve similar social policy objectives while mitigating the adverse effects of these unintended consequences.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. More direct support to all small business subcategories—in the form of additional loan programs, education and skills training, and other tangible assistance—may give small businesses the capabilities they need for long-term success without creating an artificially protected submarket for them to compete in.

2. Agency-wide small business goals could be established that aggregate both prime and subcontract work, with more emphasis placed on subcontract work, which may be more appropriate for performance by small businesses anyway and provide them with opportunities to receive mentoring without a contrived workshare split.

3. Allowing graduating firms to retain existing and subsequent work on follow-on contracts they won originally as set-aside programs after their graduation will enable them to continue to build value and provide continuity of performance on the program, contributing to the mission. They should even be able to hold onto this work in the event of a sale to a larger company and transition the work to the new owner, as long as they are performing and can continue to win the recompetes for those efforts.

4. Our focus on national security and defense should be on achieving the necessary warfighting and mission effectiveness, regardless of from whom the government is buying the capabilities. This objective should not be watered down to accommodate other social agendas.

See Full Recommendations section, pages 7–9.
INTRODUCTION

On December 17, 2018, with minimal press coverage, President Trump signed into law the Small Business Runway Extension Act, which changes the small business size calculation under revenue based North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes from a three-year to five-year average. Seemingly innocuous enough, the change has created some controversy, largely because it is perceived as benefitting some contractors and adversely impacting others, and even the Small Business Administration (SBA) has commented that it is not in favor of the move in its draft rulemaking. The SBA has advised that the Runway Extension Act is not presently in effect and is therefore not applicable to present bids until it is implemented through the agency’s standard process.

The “winners and losers” perspectives surrounding this change is a microcosm of a broader small business contracting discussion that has been growing steadily louder in the government contracting community over the past several years. Set-aside programs—including prime contracting procurement opportunities set aside for small and other specific classes of businesses, and small business subcontracting requirements under full and open procurements—have taken on an increasingly prominent position in the overall contracting landscape. The author’s experience in the industry suggests that the effects of these programs are more pronounced in some agencies than others, and in some mission or service areas than others, because agency contracting officials exercise discretion in how they implement some of the policies and regulations. However, there is a lack of empirical data on the degree to which discretion is exercised across federal agencies. Suffice it to say, these policies, legislation, and their implementing regulations impact the small businesses they were intended to address, but also have significant impacts on “other than small” businesses, whether they are large defense primes, “small-ish” businesses that just barely no longer qualify for set-aside procurement programs, or the vast array of mid-tier contractors that operate in between.

While the social and economic objectives of small business set-aside policies are inarguably admirable, they may not be rational from an economic or technical standpoint and may have unintended consequences in terms of job creation, value creation for their founders/owners, and mission effectiveness. Moreover, there may be more direct ways to achieve similar social policy objectives while mitigating the adverse effects of these unintended consequences. Gansler, et al, concluded that some of these unintended consequences could include: creating a perverse incentive not to grow; setting aside very large awards for small business can end up being counterproductive, not necessarily creating new jobs, not resulting in lower costs, having inappropriate procurements set aside for small business when agencies use the wrong NAICS code; and inviting fraud. Our present limbo, while awaiting the promulgation of implementing regulations for this latest policy change, provides a good opportunity to step back and look at the broader set-aside contracting picture. It takes at face value the social and economic objectives of these programs championed for years by their proponents. This paper offers background on set-aside contracting with a goal of providing some context for the current discussion surrounding the Small Business Runway Extension Act and identifies some of the themes related to unintended consequences that have been advanced recently by others. By initiating this discussion, the hope is to set the table for further conversation and research on this topic of growing timeliness and interest.

BACKGROUND ON SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTING

For over 65 years, beginning with the Small Business Act of 1953, the federal government has embraced legislation and policies with the goals of aiding, counseling, assisting and protecting the interests of small business concerns. The Act extended contracting preferences to small business participants in the 8(a) Business Development program, the HUBZone program, the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business program,

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and the Woman-Owned Small Business Program to diversify the industrial base, create jobs, and increase competition. While each of these virtuous programs has individual goals and objectives, this paper treats set-aside and small business programs as essentially synonymous for the purposes of this discussion.

In its earliest years, the policy focus of the Small Business Act was predominantly economic. To this day, small business was and continues to be perceived by many as the "driver and engine of growth" and the "lifeblood of our economy," and a major source of job creation, innovation and agility. The original goals of the program have continued to evolve to help achieve social policy objectives, as well. For example, the Small Disadvantaged Business 8(a) program was given statutory authority to stimulate the growth of the minority business community. Over time, similar goals were established for other sub-groups.

The federal government will spend over $500 billion in the 2020 fiscal year on products and services. Given the magnitude of the contracting dollars, every company is looking for a competitive advantage, and small business contracting programs are one way to obtain that advantage. The current government-wide small business contracting goal (it is updated every several years) is 23%, versus the initial 20% goal established by Congress in 1988. That means that nearly one of every four prime contract dollars awarded is set aside for small businesses. Small business prime contract goals vary by federal agency, from a low of 11% of prime contract dollars at the Department of Energy to a high of 71%, fittingly, at the SBA. Prime contracting goals (the same for all agencies) are also established for Small Disadvantaged Businesses (5%), Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses (3%), Women-Owned Small Businesses (5%), and HUB Zone Small Businesses (3%). In addition, the current small business subcontracting goal is approximately 34%, varying by agency, meaning that over a third of every prime contract dollar awarded to "other than small" businesses must be subcontracted out to small firms. Taken together, this suggests that small businesses are receiving, on average, roughly 49% of all federal contract dollars, either as prime contractors or as subcontractors.

There are also separate goals for subcategories of small businesses—Women-owned, Service-Disabled, Veteran-Owned, and HUB Zone. Prime contracting and subcontracting goals vary significantly by Agency and are negotiated by the SBA. Observers have noted that federal small business goals were met in 2014 and 2015 despite, in part because of (or at the expense of), the continued decline in contracting with traditional firms.

What qualifies as "small," for inclusion in and access to these small business assistance and contracting programs, differs by industry segment, which are defined according to the NAICS codes to differentiate types of businesses based on what products they produce or what services they offer. Provided that a business is independently owned and operated and not dominant in its field, Congress has granted the SBA substantial discretion in determining the size of a small business. The SBA can assign industry size standards, based either on the number of employees a firm has had over the past 12 months, or on the amount of revenues the firm has, (currently) using the average looking back over the last 3 years.

**SMALL BUSINESS RUNWAY EXTENSION ACT**

The Small Business Runway Extension Act of 2018 was a modest bipartisan bill introduced in the House of Representatives (H.R.6330) which contained only two sentences: "Modification to method for prescribing size standards for business concerns. Section 3 (a) (2) (C) (ii) (II) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632 (a)

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8. Calculated as .23 of every prime dollar, plus .34 of the remainder (1-.23) = .26 subcontract dollars, equals .49 total.

(2) (C) (ii) (II)) is amended by striking "3 years" and inserting "5 years." As described by its proponents, the purpose was "to help advanced-small contractors successfully navigate the middle market as they reach the upper limits of their small size standard."11

This small change of the SBA’s size formula was designed to reduce the impact of rapid spikes in revenue resulting from steep growth over a short period of time that may lead to a small business graduating out of its small size standard. As noted in the House committee report accompanying the bill,

“This legislation will allow small businesses at every level more time to grow and develop their competitiveness and infrastructure, before entering the open marketplace. The bill will also protect federal investment in SBA’s small business programs by promoting greater chances of success in the middle market for newly-graduated firms, resulting in enhanced competition against large prime contractors.”12

As Gerry Connolly, a Congressional representative from contractor-packed Northern Virginia has noted,

“Innovative, high performing small businesses are becoming victims of their own success—graduating from small business only to find themselves in the untenable position of facing off against multi-billion-dollar firms.”13

What the sponsors of the legislation had in mind was the case where winning a larger than previously held contract may suddenly raise a firm’s three-year average revenues above the threshold for eligibility for small business assistance. The impacts of the sudden spike in revenue would have a less dramatic impact on the firm’s five-year revenue average. Should the newly “other-than-small” firm no longer qualify for those small business set-aside procurements upon which they based their business model and established their infrastructure, they may find themselves in the position of having graduated from the small business category before they were ready to compete effectively in the full and open market without assistance.

The House Committee on Small Business report highlighted several potential benefits of extending the period for calculating whether a business is small and thus qualified for small business assistance, including improving the health of the industrial base, increasing competition, preserving jobs, and allowing businesses more lead time to develop their business plans and infrastructure to transition to mid-size more successfully.

Their thought process, however, seems tied to the scenario where the firm has a steady increase in revenues over the five-year period being averaged but does not contemplate the implications of scenarios in which a firm has a large sudden spike in revenues tied to winning a single large contract, or for firms faced with sharply declining revenues over the five-years. In the case of the large sudden spike in revenues, a firm could win a disproportionately large contract and still qualify for small business assistance. And in the last case of declining revenues, a firm that is operating at a truly subscale level that could really benefit from the assistance may not qualify because of a single year of large revenues four or five years ago. Hence, the controversy on the legislation.

**IMPLICATIONS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES**

Examples abound of businesses that have started small and graduated successfully into the realm of full and open competition. A typical success story trajectory (if there is a typical one) is a firm that leverages its customer intimacy or technical capabilities, developed as a small business with the help of small business assistance programs, to position itself to compete for and win full and open programs where they no longer have the assistance. Gradually, they transition their portfolio entirely to full and open work. Ideally, they continue to win full and open prime contracts and continue to grow.

Sometimes, companies will position themselves for one or more large full and open opportunities that will enable them to “explode through the NAICS codes” and establish themselves as a significant full and open player so that the impact of any residual small business is less of a factor on the overall portfolio of the business. In other instances, however, firms may face an alternative flight path as they

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12. Ibid.
graduate, and they are no longer eligible for set-aside procurements.

Shrinking to Grow?

Some firms may have to transition from a prime contractor role to a role as a subcontractor to another small business on those programs to hold onto at least some of their work. Their customer intimacy and technical knowledge makes them a valued subcontractor and customers typically welcome continuing to have access to the firm’s experienced people and expertise, but they may have to take a role with 49% or less of the workshare instead of the 100% of revenues they previously held as the prime. These firms walk a tight rope of giving up some of their previously held work while trying to win new full and open work as a prime as they matriculate from small business to “other than small” status.

This may result in a growth trajectory that is less of a straight line and more characterized by fits and starts. This is a challenging process to work through for the founders and leaders of these firms that requires a clear strategy, patience, and an ability to withstand risk.

Challenges Building Value

In the success story example above, the founder may be in it for the long haul and committed to building a major iconic government contractor with a legacy. And, not mutually exclusive, they may also be looking to build the value of their company in anticipation of ultimately selling it. Firms with greater full and open prime contract work in their portfolios generally are valued higher by prospective buyers than firms with small business contracts and subcontracts that the purchaser may not be able to hold onto for long after the sale (because their combined size will no longer qualify as a small business).

When a small, recently graduated, and transitioning business decides to sell, it is usually to another company that is larger and already a full and open competitor. Its value may be in customer intimacy, technical capabilities, and market presence that the purchaser desires, and an acquisition presents a more efficient or expedient means of accomplishing that objective than trying to build it organically. The downside is that after being acquired, the business that had originally won the set-aside contracts may no longer be eligible to perform that work and the purchasing company may not retain the value they hoped to in the acquisition. Knowing this, purchasers often significantly discount the purchase price they are willing to offer to companies with set-aside work, based on the expectation that they will eventually lose the work after the transaction.

Purchasers are willing to pay a premium for proven ability to win full and open work and will discount or put conditions in place for small business set aside contracts. The degree of set-aside work in the portfolio is one of the largest negative impacts on company valuation. In many cases, companies with large amounts of set-aside work just won’t transact at any price.

The potential buyer universe for these companies may be limited to other small businesses, so long as the affiliation with the target doesn’t put the combined entity over the size ceilings, but many of these firms do not have the financial where-withal to complete a transaction.

Some set-aside businesses, such as Alaskan Native firms, can skirt around these issues and have been purchasers of otherwise unlikely-to-transact small businesses because of their special status. “Other-than-small” purchasers who can find a reason to acquire the small company despite the risk of subsequently losing the work in follow on competitions, will build a significant discount into the purchase price they are willing to pay, primarily by reducing the forecasted earnings against which they are applying a purchase multiple to reflect the future loss of the set aside work.

Chances of Success?

The lack of empirical data on the impact on small firms as they exceed their size standards, the causes of success or failure when doing so, or a federally recognized definition of “other than small” (mid-sized) firms makes characterizing these challenges objectively quite difficult.14

A 2018 CSIS study found that approximately 40% of new federal contractors (presumed to be small businesses) leave the market after three years, 50–60% leave after five years, and only 20% remain for the long-term, with “successful” graduation of these firms to other-than-small status consistently declining over time.15

Owners of firms who graduate from small business status but who cannot


successfully transition their portfolios to full and open face the most challenging dilemmas.

- Too large to qualify for small-business assistance, but too small to compete successfully against larger firms, they may stagnate or decline significantly in revenues.
- They may change their business model and focus on being a subcontractor to large businesses instead of trying to win prime contracts, resulting in a loss of key prime contractor competencies and likely creating inefficiencies and additional costs for the government.
- They may go out of business, or still choose to sell at a substantial discount under the conditions described above. Some make the decision at this point to hang in there and continue doing what they can, giving up on substantial growth aspirations, drawing dividends out of what has now become known as a “lifestyle” business instead of reinvesting in the long-term growth of the business, innovation, and job creation.

Refusing to Grow
Small business set asides can create a perverse incentive not to grow. Some even intentionally slow their rate of growth and diversification to ensure that they stay small by consciously avoiding bidding and winning work that would put them over the ceiling to remain eligible for set-aside contracts. This can result in the government missing out on the participation of otherwise qualified contractors in the bidding process.

An example of this is a company this author personally dealt with several years ago that sought to undertake what they referred to as “Strategy 1500.” The NAICS code they operated under qualified them as a small business if they had fewer than 1500 employees. Once the company grew beyond 1500 employees, they found it much more difficult to compete and were consciously seeking to lose work to keep their average headcount below 1500 so they would once again qualify as a small business in the future. They ultimately were sold, absorbed by a larger firm, and lost control of the company they had built.

A more general example of this are companies that refrain from bidding on a number of opportunities that would put them over the size threshold while they wait for a large enough opportunity to come along that, if they won and “exploded through the NAICS code,” would give them such additional growth that it would be worth giving up the set-aside preferences from a company strategy standpoint.

The Impact of MACs and IDIQs
While the Small Business Runway Extension Act clearly assists some small businesses, other federal government decisions and policies have created inherent challenges to their growth. The growing shift in recent years toward government use of Multi-Agency Contracts (MACs) to acquire goods and services has further exacerbated the divide between “have” and “have not,” and small and “other than small” contractors. The MACs are essentially task order or delivery order contracts, sometimes referred to as IDIQ (Indefinite Delivery–Indefinite Quantity) vehicles, used by government agencies to acquire an increasing portion of their overall contracting needs.

Firms compete first to be selected for a MAC or IDIQ, and those holding the contract vehicle then have a “hunting license” to bid on subsequent government task order contracts. If a firm is not successful in competing for the initial contract vehicle, they may be shut out of the market for the contracted task orders by one or more agencies for years.

Increased reliance on these MACs with few on-ramp opportunities has benefitted a select group of small businesses but created significant barriers to entry for most. Some of these MACs have strenuous qualification criteria that smaller companies find difficult to meet and, in failing to do so, their growth is further constrained. And even while many of these vehicles have both full and open and small business categories, the winners in the small business category ultimately end up facing many of the same potential outcomes and challenges discussed above.

Discretion is the Better Part of . . .
Because the SBA has the discretion to set size thresholds and negotiate set-aside quotas individually and differently with each agency, certain segments of the government contracting market are likely to be affected differently than others.

Professional services firms are particularly likely to face these challenges because their size standard is among the smallest, and increased spending in this area across multiple agencies means that more companies may graduate more rapidly. Observers note that

“Set-aside policy will have the continued effect of concentrating more federal contract spending into the growing professional services sector, generating unintended consequences: uneven and unsustainable growth for the very small businesses that the

17. Ibid.
policy is intended to help, and contracting and economic inefficiency for government.”

Similarly, different agencies have the potential to take different tacks either to implementing their small business programs or to working around them to accomplish their missions. Most agencies work hard to fulfill both the spirit and the letter of the policies and regulations. Because agencies each have negotiated small business goals with the SBA, they could make inefficient contracting decisions based not on what results in the selection of the best contractor to perform a mission or provide a solution but what best helps them meet their quotas.

When agencies use the wrong NAICS code, inappropriate procurements are set aside for small business. The 809 Panel recently noted that both firms and government contracting offices “game the system” by code shopping—selecting a specific NAICS code that has an employee or revenue level that enables them to select a particular contractor, rather than the code that may be more appropriate for the specific work. And as noted above, in one of most comprehensive analyses of the unintended consequences of set-aside contracting, Gansler, et al noted that small business contracting does not necessarily create new jobs, costs may not be lower, and setting aside very large awards for small business can actually be counterproductive.

Contractor “Shaping” and “Workarounds”

Large firms have been frustrated for years by the amount of government contracts set aside for small businesses. Mid-tier companies may face the worst of all worlds because they are too big to qualify for the increasing amounts of set-aside work and also have to compete against the large firms. Both have routinely sought to work around the programs as best they are able to. Subcontracting up to 49% of the content on a program that uses a small business as a “front” is the most common. Lobbying customers to categorize forthcoming procurements as full and open is another common tactic, but many agencies will justify setting aside a contract for small business if two or more small firms are qualified to perform the work, regardless of whether or not they are the best qualified. Trying to convince customers to use a different NAICS code for the procurement (such as an R&D code which has a larger size standard than other service codes) under which the contractor may still qualify as small, is another tactic.

DoD began the first federal Mentor-Protégé program during the First Gulf War with a goal of increasing eligible small business participation in the defense industrial base. While many large firms take mentoring seriously in these programs, providing valuable program management and other skills to their small business partners, many also have leveraged these approaches to gain access to opportunities that might otherwise have been totally set aside for small businesses. In the last several years, the SBA has established a new Mentor-Protégé Joint Venture program that allows large business partners to perform up to 60% of the work on a contract bid by the joint venture, instead of the 49% limit under traditional small business set aside programs. On significant bids, that additional 11% of revenue and work scope can make a big difference to even a large contractor.

Focusing on Innovation

The emphasis in this paper on the broader implications and unintended consequences of small business programs is not intended to take away from the positive contributions they can make to the performance of important government missions or to say that they do not have an appropriate place in the contracting landscape. Gansler, et al. noted that small business programs are most successful when they are focused on innovation. Smaller businesses are inherently more agile than large companies and can provide a high level of responsiveness to evolving mission needs. Moreover, many small businesses are founded around providing a specific technical capability to meet a limited set of specific applications, and their focus on these mission challenges can make major contributions where needed most. Alas, the 809 Panel concluded:

“DoD is not fully capitalizing on small businesses’ innovativeness. Instead, DoD appears to focus its small business policies and programs on acquiring goods and services based on meeting societal goals not related to mission.”

21. Ibid.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As noted, there is relatively little empirical data on the long-term success or failure rates of small businesses once they have graduated and anecdotal accounts are all over the map.

Gansler, et al. noted that SBA goals appear to be somewhat arbitrarily established and applied, and they do not measure the true impact on small business success or failure over the long term.

The government’s recent 809 Panel observed that “many [small firms] that pursue business with DoD for the first time are either unaware of or under-estimate the potential effects of audits, paperwork, and other processes on their companies’ abilities to operate.”

The recent CSIS study cited above noted a very high incidence of market exit for new entrant small businesses in the government contracting market several years after entrance but shed little light on causes for those exits or linkages to specific policy or regulatory impacts on success or failure.

The broader context and challenge for set-aside contracting is its attempted conflating of socio-economic, mission, technology, and corporate financial objectives into a single set of policies and regulations, simultaneously trying to evolve them to meet changing needs and apply them consistently across an enormously diverse landscape of agencies, programs, product and services offerings. In trying to do too much, these policies and regulations may sub-optimize our success against any specific objective.

A more directed effort aimed at validating our objectives individually and developing tailored policy and regulatory responses to each of them may be in order. Here are just a few recommendations to begin this conversation—a conversation which has not really taken place outside of the societal goals framework.

1. More direct support to all of the set-aside business subcategories—in the form of additional loan programs, education and skills training, and other tangible assistance—may give small businesses the capabilities they need for long-term success without creating an artificially protected submarket for them to compete in.

   Areas for further work: What types of direct support can most significantly contribute to the long-term success of small businesses? How does and should set-aside contracting fit into the broader picture of positioning small businesses for sustainable long-term success?

2. Agency-wide small business goals could be established that aggregate both prime and subcontract work, with more emphasis placed on subcontract work, which may be more appropriate for performance by small businesses anyway and provide them with opportunities to receive mentoring without a contrived workshare split.

   Areas for further work: How would use of aggregated small business goals change the way agencies procure? What would be the impact on the structure of the government contracting market be of implementing an aggregated small business goal policy?

3. Allowing graduating firms to retain existing and subsequent work on follow-on contracts they won originally as set-aside programs after their graduation will enable them to continue to build value and provide continuity of performance on the program, contributing to the mission. They should even be able to hold onto this work in the event of a sale to a larger company and transition the work to the new owner, as long as they are performing and can continue to win the recompetes for those efforts.

   Areas for further work: Would the prospects of being able to hold on longer to work that was originally won as set-aside reduce the number of firms exiting from the industry? Would implementing such a policy dramatically increase industry consolidation activity through increased acquisitions of smaller firms by larger firms, and if so, would this create additional efficiencies in the market as well as greater incentives for small business founder owners?

4. Our focus on national security and defense should be on achieving the necessary warfighting and mission effectiveness, regardless of from whom the government is buying the capabilities. This objective should not be watered down to accommodate other social agendas.

   Areas for further work: If maximizing warfighting and mission effectiveness were truly the independent variable in procurement policy, how would that change government acquisition behaviors? What would be the most appropriate role for small businesses in this scenario? How big a price are we paying, in terms of reduced warfighting and mission effectiveness, by not making this our highest priority?

   Each of these ideas would benefit from considerable additional exploration and research, as suggested above. All would

benefit from additional research resulting in a greater empirical foundation of data on what really contributes to small businesses success or failure.

One might also expect that every individual business may have its unique story, its own set of triumphs and challenges, and might warrant its own case study. A solid body of case studies on small businesses that have successfully graduated and where their journey has taken them on the one hand, as well as case studies of firms that have failed or exited the market on the other, may create more generalizable observations and recommendations than we have from the more anecdotal observations we have today. Whether or not the sum of all those individual case studies may yield conclusions that can improve policy and regulatory frameworks remains to be seen.

The SBA is currently drafting revisions to their regulations and forms to implement the Small Business Runway Extension Act. Until SBA changes its regulations, businesses still must report their receipts based on the three-year methodology. But against the backdrop of this discussion, one can wonder what the real impact will be of extending the runway to five years: on long-term success or failure of eligible small businesses; on the mid-tier who will have to continue to struggle to compete against both large firms and small firms continuing to receive assistance; on founders of firms who may want to sell their businesses or larger firms that may want to buy a company; on delivering innovation and maximizing mission effectiveness. Whether or not the extension of the runway from three to five years will achieve its intended objectives remains to be seen but the extension will undoubtedly have its own unintended consequences.


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His previous leadership positions were Founder and President of Growth Strategy Leaders; President and Chief Operating Officer of NT Concepts; Senior Vice President of Strategy and Corporate Development at Engility; Senior Vice President of Strategy and Corporate Development at DynCorp International; Vice President of Strategy and Business Development at Northrop Grumman Mission Systems; Managing Director at CSP Associates; various leadership roles at Lockheed Martin, and Senior Policy Advisor and Executive Director of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board at the U.S. Department of Energy. He has served on the Boards of Advisors and Boards of Directors for numerous privately-owned government contractors and industry associations, and currently serves on the Board of Directors for the Association for Corporate Growth (National Capital), and the Board of Advisors for George Mason University’s Center for Government Contracting.

Craig holds a Ph.D. in public policy with a concentration in national security studies from George Washington University, a Master of International Affairs degree with concentrations in international business and national security studies from Columbia University, and B.A. degrees in honors programs in both political science and psychology from the State University of New York at Albany. He recently served as an adjunct professor and continues to serve as a Senior Research Fellow and Affiliate Faculty member at George Mason University’s Business School.
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